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Abstract. Openness is a key criterion of security algorithms and pro-
tocols which enable them to be subjected to scrutiny by independent
security experts. The alternative “methodology” of secret proprietary
algorithms and protocols has often ended in practical breaks, e.g. of the
MIFARE Oyster cards for public transport or the KeeLoq remote control
systems. Open evaluation is common for general applications of security,
e.g. the NIST competitions for selection of the Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES) and the Secure Hash Algorithm 3 (SHA-3). Nowadays
an increasing number of embedded security applications apply the prin-
ciple of open evaluation as well. A recent example is the specification
of an open security protocol stack for car immobilizer applications by
Atmel, which has been presented at ESCAR 2010. This stack is primarily
intended to be used in conjunction with automotive transponder chips
of this manufacturer, but could in principle be deployed on any suitable
type of transponder chip. In this paper we analyze the security of this
protocol stack. We were able to uncover a number of potential security
vulnerabilities, for which we suggest fixes.
Keywords: Security, car immobilizer, algorithms, protocols, openness,
analysis.
1 Introduction
Securing systems through secrecy of the involved algorithms and protocols is not
always successful. Often, once the details of the algorithm have been disclosed
through various channels, practical attacks quickly become possible, e.g. on
the MIFARE Oyster card for the London transport system [6] or the KeeLoq
algorithm used in remote control systems [7]. In contrast, subjection of crypto-
graphic methods to public scrutiny is a widely accepted method of preventing
such breaks during deployment. Prominent examples of this strategy are the
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) competition [11] and the Secure Hash
Algorithm-3 (SHA-3) competition [12]. In this paper we analyze the security of
a car immobilizer protocol stack which is facilitated by its openness.
A car immobilizer is a system that requires the presence of a security token
(often in the form of a key fob) to allow a car to run. If this token is not present,
the car’s Engine Control Unit (ECU) interrupts key components like the ignition,
the starter motor circuit, or the fuel pump. The communication between car and
key fob is typically done via RFID, where the car is fitted with an RFID reader
and the key fob contains an RFID tag. While earlier models used a static code
in the key fob, modern immobilizers utilize either rolling codes or cryptography
to prevent duplication of the key fob. Communication between car and key fob
involves the use of a protocol stack which defines frame sizes, data formats, error
detection, data transformations, etc.
An open security protocol stack for car immobilizer applications has been
presented in [8]. It is mainly intended for use with specific automotive transpon-
der chips. According to [8], the stack consists of a physical layer, a logical
layer, a protocol layer, and the AES crypto layer. The physical layer deals with
modulation types, data encoding, and bit timing. The logical layer defines the
functional behavior of the reader and the transponder and includes communica-
tion link controls, controls configuration, setup of functional dependencies and
error resolution. The protocol layer allocates data frames and buffers for reading
and writing. It implements the user command interface, authentication, and key
learning (i.e. changing cryptographic keys before and after deployment). The
AES crypto layer controls the data authentication results1. Both physical and
AES crypto layer are already industry standards. The logical and protocol layer,
which are usually proprietary, are made open. This means the specification of
these layers is available for inspection and modification.
The protocol stack implements a number of commands to be issued by
the reader to the key fob. In most cases, the car featuring the immobilizer
functionality acts as reader but the reader can also be a programming device
used by the car manufacturer or distributor. The communication between reader
and key fob uses the LF band at 125 kHz. In this band, the normal read range
is usually very limited (commonly a few centimetres), but there are readers
available which can extend it to up to one metre [3, 5] and thus allowing for
attacks in close proximity of the key fob.
The command set out in the protocol stack’s specification [1] encompasses
eleven commands. They include reading of the key fob’s unique ID (UID) and
error status, initiation of authentication, setting of the used secret keys, initiation
and leaving of the so-called enhanced mode (for RF communication powered by
the battery), a request to repeat the last response, reading and writing of user
memory as well as setting memory access protection to certain memory sections.
Authentication can be configured to be unilateral (only key fob authenticates
itself to the reader) or bilateral (both key fob and reader authenticate themselves
to each other). If bilateral authentication is configured, some commands like
reading and writing user memory can only be executed when there has been a
previous successful authentication.
1 The description of this protocol layer in [8] probably refers to the use of the AES
block cipher in the execution of various commands by reader and key fob. As such it
is debatable whether it constitutes a separate layer or should be considered as part
of the protocol layer.
Authentication follows the challenge-response pattern [10]. The party who
wants to authenticate sends out a challenge (usually a random number) and
the other participant transforms the challenge cryptographically using a secret
or private key and returns the response. The first party then checks this result
using its knowledge of the same secret key or the according public key. The point
of the challenge is to prevent replay attacks, where messages recorded from a
genuine protocol run are replayed by an attacker at a later time to achieve
authentication. Therefore, the challenge must be non-repeating or only repeat
with negligible probability.
The investigated protocol stack has the caveat that the key fob is not ex-
pected to be able to generate challenges. This is no problem for unilateral
authentication, where the challenge is generated by the reader alone, but poses
difficulties for bilateral authentication. Bilateral authentication works by reusing
the challenge from the reader for the challenge of the key fob. The cryptographic
transformation involved in the authentication is AES encryption with one of two
shared keys. Figure 1 shows the essential steps of bilateral authentication as given
in [1]. Note that the complete authentication also includes the car reading the
UID from the key fob in order to allow early termination of the protocol when
a wrong key fob is accidentally in read range. We have omitted this part of the
authentication protocol as it is not of interest from a security point of view.
Generate RandN
AES encryption Key 1
AES encryption
Select M bits
(= RandM)
Key 2
RandN, RandM
Key fob Car
AES encryptionKey 1
AES encryptionKey 2
Is equal?
RandN
R
an
dM
STOP
N
Y
RespM
Select M bits
(= RespM)
Is equal? STOP
N
Y
VALID
Fig. 1: Bilateral authentication between key fob and car.
Car and key fob share two AES keys (Key 1 and Key 2). The car generates
the N-bit challenge RandN, encrypts it with Key 1 and selects M bits of the
resulting ciphertext as RandM. N and M can be configured to be less than the
AES block size of 128 bits in order to reduce communication overhead. RandN
and RandM are sent to the key fob, which validates that RandM originated from
RandN via encryption with Key 1. If this is successful, the car is authenticated
to the key fob. The key fob uses the output of the first AES encryption as input
for a second AES encryption with Key 2. As this value is not fully known to an
eavesdropper (M being usually smaller than 128), it is also denoted as hidden
challenge. M bits of the second encryption result are selected as RespM, which
is sent to the car. The car then verifies that RespM resulted from encryption
with Key 2. On success, the key fob is authenticated to the car and bilateral
authentication is finished.
2 Tracking
The protocol stack includes the “ReadUID” command to retrieve the 32-bit UID
from the key fob. There is no security mechanism in place which would require
authentication by the reader. Therefore, any reader can request the UID and the
key fob can be potentially tracked via a number of readers installed at various
places.
Tracking could be prevented if the UID is not returned in cleartext, but
dependent on a shared secret and a nonce. A simple example is to use the
existing AES encryption EK with one of the pre-shared keys K in a tweakable
block cipher construction E˜K [9].
E˜K(nonce,UID) = EK(nonce⊕ EK(UID)) (1)
The result of E˜K will vary with the nonce and the UID will be protected even
when the nonce is revealed. Thus, even though the key fob can be still queried
by any reader, the result cannot be used any more to track it.
There are two options for the values returned by the key fob depending on the
actual functional requirements. If the complete result of E˜K is returned alongside
with the nonce, the reader can decrypt it and arrive at the original UID. Thus,
the full functionality of the original “ReadUID” command is retained. This comes
at the price of a relatively high communication overhead as the key fob needs
to send the 128-bit ciphertext E˜K and the nonce. The computational overhead
would essentially be the generation of the nonce and two AES encryptions on
the key fob side and two AES decryptions on the reader side.
Alternatively, the reader could still check for a specific UID if only a part
of the result of E˜K were returned with the nonce. This could be useful if the
reader requires the “ReadUID” command exclusively to check for a specific UID.
We denote this new command as “CheckUID” and its functionality is shown in
Figure 2. It’s advantage is a shorter response and a better response time of the
key fob compared to the enhanced “ReadUID” command.
By varying the size of the nonce and the portion of E˜K to be checked
(M-bit RespM), the security and communication overhead can be balanced. For
example, using a 32-bit portion of E˜K for checking, a similar resilience against
Fig. 2: Enhanced “CheckUID” command with resistance against tracking.
accidentally matching UIDs would be introduced as in the original protocol stack
with 32-bit UIDs. The communication overhead would consist of the extra bits of
the nonce and the computational overhead would be the generation of the nonce
for the key fob and two extra AES encryptions for key fob and reader each. The
encrypted UID (EK(UID)) could also be pre-computed and stored which would
reduce the computational overhead by one AES encryption for each side.
In both cases, the key fob must be able to generate nonces. This might
require a key fob with slightly higher capabilities as set out in the protocol stack
specification. Generation of nonces is also required by the countermeasure to the
attack described in Section 5.
3 Denial-of-Service Attacks
The protocol stack includes commands for writing new cryptographic keys to
the key fob, which replaces the old keys used for authentication. There are two
different modes for doing this: In open mode, a “Learn Secret Key1” or “Learn
Secret Key2” can be issued by any reader in order to set new keys. In secure
mode, an encrypted key is sent by the reader device, decrypted by the key fob
and the result is set as new key as shown in Figure 3. The key used for encrypting
the new key is the so-called Default Secret Key which is factory set.
Overwriting keys in open mode is trivial, as the malicious reader only has
to send the according command to set the keys to those of her choice. However,
Fig. 3: LearnSecretKey command in secure mode.
even in secure mode it is possible to overwrite keys though the value of the new
keys stays hidden to the attacker. This is possible because the secure key learn
command only uses the encrypted key but no integrity check for it. Therefore,
an attacker can send a random value as encrypted key and the key fob will set
the decrypted value as new key.
Thus, in both open and secure mode, keys can be overwritten without the
need of knowing a shared secret. Once this has been done, the key fob will no
longer work with the car. If the key fob is queried in intervals while the car is
in motion, it might even be possible to force the immobilizer to stop the car by
overwriting the keys.
The open mode is vulnerable against this attack per design. To defend
against the attack in secure mode, a message authentication code (MAC) should
be included with the encrypted key and the key should only be overwritten
when the MAC is verified successfully. This entails communication overhead for
transmission of the MAC from the reader to the key fob and computational
overhead of MAC generation in the reader and MAC verification in the key fob.
4 Relay Attack with Genuine Key Fob
Another type of attack tricks the car into thinking that the key fob is in its
immediate vicinity when it is actually located further away. Such relay attacks
have been known as early as 1976 [2] and have been practically demonstrated,
e.g. in [4] for the EMV chip and PIN setting. In the current setting, this attack
relays messages between the genuine key fob and the car through a transparent
reader (close to the genuine key fob) connected to a transparent key fob (close
to the car) as shown in Figure 4. Such an attack would require two cooperating
attackers, one bringing the transparent reader close to the genuine key fob and
the other gaining entry to the car and bringing the transparent key fob close to
the car’s reader.
Fig. 4: Relay attack with transparent reader and key fob.
A potential countermeasure to this relay attack is to measure the communi-
cation delay between the reader’s challenge and the key fob’s response in order to
detect the actual distance between the communicating endpoints. Alternatively,
a dedicated protocol, like the distance bounding protocol used in [4] could be
employed. However, the protocol stack includes a mechanism to defeat such
countermeasures. If the transparent key fob fakes an uplink CRC error, this
forces the car to send a “Repeat Last Response” command. The attacker can
use the extra time for the repeated response to get the actual response from the
genuine key fob.
This remote attack could be defended against with the measurement of the
communication delay of the key fob by the car and by abandoning the mechanism
of requesting a repeat of the the key fob’s response in answer to a CRC error.
Instead the whole sequence of commands and responses should be repeated
when a CRC error is encountered. This gives the attacker no time to hide the
extra communication delay introduced by the transparent reader and key fob.
Measurement of the communication delay might require extra components (e.g.
a high-precision oscillator) at the car’s side.
5 Replay Attack on Authentication
A unique property of the bilateral authentication protocol in the immobilizer
stack is that the key fob is not required to generate nonces. Instead, the encrypted
nonce from the reader is “reused” as the challenge from the key fob. While this
makes the structure of the key fob simpler, it also means the commands from
the reader can be recorded and replayed at a later time to achieve authentica-
tion. Thus an attacker can pretend to be an authenticated reader, which gives
her access to advanced commands like ”Read User Memory” and ”Write User
Memory”.
A defense against this attack is to have the key fob generate the challenges
for the reader. Without a challenge from the key fob, the replay of the reader
command will lead to a successful authentication of the reader.
6 Spoofing Attack on Memory Access Protection
The protocol stack allows the reader to lock the EEPROM sections AP1 to AP3
via a “Write Memory Access Protection” command. This command is accepted
by the key fob without prior authentication. Depending on the actual use of
these EEPROM sections, an attacker could impair the functionality of the key
fob by locking them with a spoofed command.
By requiring prior authentication for the “Write Memory Access Protection”
command this attack can be prevented.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have identified a number of potential security vulnerabilities in
an open car immobilizer stack. The vulnerabilities include tracking of key fobs,
denial-of-service attacks to render key fobs useless, achieving key fob authentica-
tion despite absence of the key fob (relay attack), achieving reader authentication
via a replay attack, and a spoof attack to lock out EEPROM sections of the key
fob. For each of the identified vulnerabilities we propose countermeasures. This
proves the great value of the openness of the protocol stack to public review.
Some of our proposed countermeasures can be implemented rather easily while
others require enhanced functionalities from the reader and/or the key fob.
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